Cryptographic protocol design in a two-party setting has often ignored the possibility of simultaneous message transmission by each of the two parties (i.e., using a duplex channel). In particular, most protocols for two-party key exchange have been designed assuming that parties alternate sending their messages (i.e., assuming a bidirectional half-duplex channel). However, by taking advantage of the communication characteristics of the network it may be possible to design protocols with improved latency. This is the focus of the present work.
Introduction
Key-exchange protocols are among the most basic and widely used cryptographic protocols. Such protocols are used to derive a common session key between two (or more) parties; this session key may then be used to communicate securely over an insecure public network. Thus, secure key-exchange protocols serve as basic building blocks for constructing secure, complex, higherlevel protocols. For this reason, the computational efficiency, communication efficiency, and round complexity of key-exchange protocols are very important and have received much attention, both in the two-party [17, 22, 6, 18, 5, 4, 7, 8, 15] and multi-party (i.e., group) [19, 14, 26, 20, 2, 13, 10, 21] settings.
This paper concerns protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE); achieving such authentication is only possible if some out-of-band initialization phase is assumed prior to execution of the protocol. One common assumption is that each communicating party has an associated public-/private-key pair, with the public key known to all other parties in the network (of course, this includes the adversary). We assume this model here.
Most protocols for two-party key exchange have been designed and analyzed assuming that parties alternate sending messages (equivalently, that the parties communicate over a bidirectional half-duplex channel). However, in many common scenarios parties can actually transmit messages simultaneously (i.e., they have access to a bidirectional duplex channel). Of course, any key-exchange protocol designed and proven secure in the former model will also be secure in the latter model 1 ; however, it may be possible to design protocols with improved round complexity by fully exploiting the communication characteristics of the underlying network, and in particular the possibility of simultaneous message transmission.
As a simple example, consider the traditional Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol [17] which does not provide any authentication. Traditionally, this is described as a two-round protocol in which Alice first sends g a and Bob then replies with g b . However, in this particular case Alice and Bob can send their messages simultaneously, thereby "collapsing" this protocol to a single round. However, the situation is more complex when authentication is required. For instance, authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange typically involves one party signing messages sent by the other party; this may be viewed as a type of "challenge-response" mechanism. (For example, the work of Bellare, et al. [5, 4] suggests implementing "authenticated channels" in exactly this way.) When this is done, it is no longer possible to collapse the protocol to a single round.
Motivated by the above discussion, we explore the possibility of designing protocols for authenticated key exchange which can be implemented in only a single round (assuming simultaneous message transmission). Of course, we will also ensure that our protocols are efficient with respect to other measures, including communication complexity and computational efficiency.
Our Work in Relation to Prior Work
Before relating our work to prior work in this area, we briefly recall some of the various notions of security for key exchange protocols (formal definitions are given in Section 2.3). At the most basic level, an authenticated key-exchange scheme must provide secrecy of a generated session key. Yet to completely define a notion of security, we must define the class of adversarial behavior tolerated by the protocol. The minimum requirement is that a protocol should ensure secrecy of session keys for an adversary who passively eavesdrops on protocol executions and may also send messages of its choice to the various parties. A stronger notion of security (and the one that is perhaps most often considered in the cryptographic literature) is key independence, which means that session keys are computationally independent from each other. A bit more formally, key independence protects against "Denning-Sacco" attacks [16] involving compromise of multiple session keys for sessions other than the one whose secrecy is being considered. Lastly, protocols achieving forward secrecy [18] maintain secrecy of session keys even when an adversary is able to obtain long-term secret keys of principals who have previously generated a common session key (in an honest execution of the protocol, without any interference by the adversary).
Key exchange protocols may also be required to provide some form of authentication. We distinguish implicit authentication, whereby only the intended partner of a particular party A knows the session key held by A, and explicit authentication, whereby A knows that its intended partner indeed holds a matching session key. (See [5] for further discussion and formal definitions.)
Boyd-Nieto (see note)
T S1 [10] to T S1. Efficiency of the Boyd-Nieto scheme depends on the instantiation of its generic components; the above are rough estimates assuming the random oracle model and "discrete-log-based" components using an order-q subgroup of * p .
We note that it is also possible to convert a protocol providing implicit authentication to one providing explicit authentication, at the cost of one additional round, by adding a "challengeresponse" exchange at the end of the protocol. The original two-party key-exchange scheme of Diffie and Hellman [17] is secure against passive eavesdroppers, but not against active attacks; indeed, that protocol provides no authentication at all. Several variations of the scheme have been suggested to provide security against active attacks [22, 23, 24, 8] . There are only a few provably secure schemes in the literature which provide both key independence and forward secrecy. Most such schemes seem to be "overloaded" so as to provide explicit authentication as well. (For example, the schemes of [1, 7, 4 ] use signatures and/or message authentication codes to authenticate messages in a way that achieves explicit authentication.) However, in some cases explicit authentication may be unnecessary, or may be provided anyway by subsequent communication. Thus, one may wonder whether more efficient protocols (say, with reduced round complexity) are possible if explicit authentication is not a requirement.
We first propose and analyze a very simple one-round scheme, T S1, which provides key independence but not forward secrecy, based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. In Table 1 we compare our scheme to the scheme of Boyd and Nieto [10] which achieves the same level of security in the same number of rounds. (Boyd and Nieto actually propose a protocol for group AKE, but their protocol can be suitable modified for the case of two parties.) Our scheme is (slightly) more efficient than the scheme of Boyd and Nieto and has other advantages as well: our protocol is simpler and is also symmetric with respect to the two parties.
We next propose a modification of this scheme, T S2, which provides both key independence and forward secrecy yet still requires only a single round of communication (security is again proved based on the CDH assumption in the random oracle model). We are not aware of any previous one-round protocol achieving this level of security. T S2 requires only 3 modular exponentiations per party and uses neither key confirmation nor digital signatures, and hence the protocol is more efficient than previous schemes in terms of computation and communication as well. A drawback of T S2 is that its security is analyzed in the random oracle model. For this reason, we propose a third protocol, T S3, which provides the same level of security in the same number of rounds but whose security can be analyzed in the standard model based on the stronger, but still standard, decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. This protocol is only slightly less efficient than T S2 (it uses message authentication codes, whose efficiency is negligible compared to modular exponentiations). We compare both of these protocols to previous work in Table 2 . [1, 7] Auth. DH T S2 T S3 (cf. [4] Table 2 : Comparison of key-exchange protocols achieving key independence and forward secrecy. Efficiency of some schemes depends on instantiation details; the above represent rough estimates assuming "discrete-log-based" instantiations using an order-q subgroup of * p .
Preliminaries

The Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Let GG be an algorithm which on input 1 k outputs a (description of a) group G of prime order q (with |q| = k) along with a generator g ∈ G. The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is the following: given g u 1 , g u 2 for random u 1 , u 2 ∈ q , compute g u 1 u 2 . We say that GG satisfies the CDH assumption if this problem is infeasible for all ppt algorithms. More formally, for any ppt algorithm A consider the following experiment:
The advantage of an adversary A is defined as follows:
We say that GG satisfies the CDH assumption if Adv cdh A,GG (k) is negligible for all ppt algorithms A. When we are interested in a concrete security analysis, we drop the dependence on k and say that GG is (t, ǫ)-secure with respect to the CDH problem if Adv cdh A,GG ≤ ǫ for all A running in time at most t. (We will sometimes be informal and say that a group G output by GG satisfies the CDH assumption.)
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem
Let GG be as in the previous section. The decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption is the following: given g u 1 , g u 2 for random u 1 , u 2 ∈ q , distinguish between g u 1 u 2 and a random group element. We say that GG satisfies the DDH assumption if this problem is infeasible for all ppt algorithms. More formally, for any ppt algorithm A consider the following experiment:
We say that GG satisfies the DDH assumption if Adv ddh A,GG (k) is negligible for all ppt algorithms A. When we are interested in a concrete security analysis, we drop the dependence on k and say that GG is (t, ǫ)-secure with respect to the DDH problem if Adv ddh A,GG ≤ ǫ for all A running in time at most t. (We will sometimes be informal and say that a group G output by GG satisfies the DDH assumption.)
Message Authentication Codes
A message authentication code (MAC) consists of two algorithms (Mac, Vrfy). Given a random key sk, MAC computes a tag τ for a message M ; we write this as τ ← Mac sk (M ). Vrfy verifies the message-tag pair using the (shared) key, and returns 1 if the tag is valid or 0 otherwise. We require that for all keys sk, for all M , and for all τ output by Mac sk (M ) we have Vrfy sk (M, τ ) = 1.
In defining the security of a MAC we use the standard definition of strong unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack. Namely, let M be a MAC scheme and A be an adversary, and consider the following experiment:
never returned τ on input M then return 1 else return 0
The advantage of an adversary A is defined as:
is negligible for all ppt algorithms A. When we are interested in a concrete security analysis, we drop the dependence on k and say that M is (t, q, ǫ)-SUF-secure if Adv suf A,M ≤ ǫ for all A running in time t and making at mostueries to its Mac oracle. (We remark that allowing N queries to an oracle Vrfy sk (·, ·) cannot increase the advantage of an adversary by more than a factor of N .)
Security Model for Authenticated Key Exchange
We use the standard notion of security as defined in [5] , taking into account forward secrecy following [18] . We assume that there are N parties, and each party's identity is denoted as P i . Each party P i holds a pair of private and public keys, where the public key is assumed to be known to all other parties in the network (and the adversary, too). We consider key-exchange protocols in which two parties want to exchange a session key using their public keys to provide authentication. Π k i represents the k-th instance of player P i . If a key-exchange protocol terminates, then Π k i generates a session key sk k i . A session identifier of an instance, denoted sid k i , is a string different from those of all other sessions in the system (with high probability). Without loss of generality, we assume that sid k i is simply the concatenation of all messages sent and received by a particular instance Π k i , where the order of these messages is determined by the lexicographic ordering of the two parties' identities. (Note that ordering messages according to the time they were sent cannot be used in our setting, because the two parties may send their messages simultaneously.)
Consider instance Π k i of player P i . The partner of this instance is the player with whom P i believes it is interacting. We say that two instances Π k i and Π k ′ j are partnered if sid
, and P i is the partner of Π k ′ j . Any protocol should satisfy the following correctness condition: two partnered instances compute the same session key.
To define a notion of security, we define the capabilities of an adversary. We allow the adversary to potentially control all communication in the network via access to a set of oracles as defined below. We consider an experiment in which the adversary asks queries to oracles, and the oracles answer back to the adversary. Oracle queries model attacks which an adversary may use in the real system. We consider the following types of queries in this paper.
• The query Initiate(i, j) is used to "prompt" party P i to initiate execution of the protocol with partner P j . This query will result in P i sending a message, which is given to the adversary.
• A query Send(i, k, M ) is used to send a message M to instance Π k i (this models active attacks on the part of the adversary). When Π k i receives M , it responds according to the key-exchange protocol.
• A query Execute(i, j) represents passive eavesdropping of the adversary on an execution of the protocol by parties P i and P j . In response to this query, parties P i and P j execute the protocol without any interference from the adversary, and the adversary is given the resulting transcript of the execution. (Although the actions of the Execute query can be simulated via repeated Initiate and Send oracle queries, this particular query is needed to distinguish between passive and active attacks in the definition of forward secrecy.)
• A query Reveal(i, k) models known key attacks (or Denning-Sacco attacks) in the real system. The adversary is given the session key sk k i for the specified instance.
• A query Corrupt(P i ) models exposure of the long-term key held by player P i . The adversary is assumed to be able to obtain long-term keys of players, but cannot control the behavior of these players directly (of course, once the adversary has asked a query Corrupt(P i ), the adversary may impersonate P i in subsequent Send queries.)
• A query Test(i, k) is used to define the advantage of an adversary. When an adversary A asks a Test query to an instance Π k i , a coin b is flipped. If b is 1, then the session key sk k i is returned. Otherwise, a random session key (i.e., one chosen uniformly from the space of session keys) is returned. The adversary is allowed to make a single Test query to a fresh instance (see below), at any time during the experiment.
To define a meaningful notion of security, we must first define freshness:
is fresh if the following conditions are true at the conclusion of the experiment described above:
(a) The adversary has not queried Reveal(i, k) or Reveal(j, k ′ ).
(b) If the adversary has queried Corrupt(P i ) or Corrupt(P j ), then it has not queried Send(i, k, * )
or Send(j, k ′ , * ). 2 In all the notions of security considered below, the adversary A outputs a bit b ′ at the end of the experiment above. The advantage of A, denoted Adv A (k), is defined as |2 · Pr[b ′ = b] − 1|. Generically speaking, a protocol is called "secure" if the advantage of any ppt adversary is negligible. The following notions of security may then be considered, depending on the types of queries the adversary is allowed to ask:
(1) The most basic level of security does not allow adversary A to make any Reveal or Corrupt queries.
(2) KI (Key Independence): An adversary A can ask Reveal queries, but can not ask Corrupt queries.
(3) FS (Forward Secrecy): An adversary A is now allowed to ask any of the above queries (i.e., including Corrupt).
Note that forward secrecy implies key independence.
For an adversary A attacking a scheme in the sense of XX (where XX is either KI or FS), we denote the advantage of this adversary by Adv XX A (k). For a protocol P , we define its security as:
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries running in time t. A scheme P is said to be XX-secure if Adv XX P (k, t) is negligible (in k) for any t = poly(k).
One-Round Protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange
For each of the protocols we present, we assume that parties can be ordered by their names (e.g., lexicographically) and write P i < P j to denote this ordering. Let k be a security parameter, and let G be a group of prime order q (where |q| = k) with generator g. Let H be a hash function such that H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k . (We assume that G, q, g, and H are fixed in advance and known to the entire network.) We assume that each party P i has a public-/private-key pair (y i = g x i , x i ), and that the public keys of all parties are known to all other parties in the network (and the adversary as well). Recall that the standard definition of security (discussed above) does not include the possibility of "malicious insiders"; thus, in particular, we assume that all public-/secret-keys are honestly generated.
Protocol T S1
We now present our first protocol T S1. The protocol is described from the perspective of P i , but its partner P j behaves analogously (i.e., the protocol is symmetric):
T S1
Setup: Assume P i wants to establish a session key with P j , and P i < P j .
Round 1: P i selects a random number r i ∈ R {0, 1} k , transmits it, and receives a random r j which is supposedly from P j .
Computation of session key: P i forms a session identifier by concatenating the messages according to the ordering of P i , P j ; i.e., it sets sid i = r i ||r j . Party P i computes the session key sk i = H(i||j||sid i ||y
An example of an execution of T S1 is shown in Fig. 1 (which assumes P 1 < P 2 ). The following theorem states the security achieved by this protocol.
2 ) = H(1||2||sid||y Theorem 1 Assuming G satisfies the CDH assumption, T S1 is a KI-secure key-exchange protocol when H is modeled as a random oracle. Concretely, if G is generated by GG which is (t, ǫ)-secure with respect to the CDH problem, then
where t is the maximum total experiment time including the adversary's execution time, and the adversary makes q re Reveal queries and q H hash queries. Here, N is an upper bound on the number of parties, and q s is an upper bound on the number of the sessions in the experiment.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Consider an adversary A attacking T S1 in the sense of key independence. Informally, and using the fact that we work in the random oracle model, there are only two ways an adversary can get information about a particular session key sk k i = H(i||j||sid k i ||g x i x j ) for a fresh instance: either the adversary queries the random oracle on the point i||j||sid k i ||g x i x j , or the value sid k i has repeated (for the same pair of users) at some point during the experiment. The latter case happens with probability upper-bounded by q 2 s 2 k , while the former case allows us to solve the computational DiffieHellman problem with probability related to that of the adversary's success probability. We now proceed with a more formal proof.
Let col denote the event that a value of sid repeats at some point during the experiment, and let query be the event that, for some i, j ∈ [N ], the adversary at some point makes an oracle query H(i||j|| * ||W ) with W = g x i x j . We may write
Now, as noted previously, Pr A [col] is bounded from above by q 2 s /2 k by a "birthday problem" calculation, since for this event to occur two random nonces of length k generated by some player(s) in separate instances must repeat. We now bound the first term in Eq. (1) .
Consider the following algorithm F which attempts to solve the CDH problem using A as a subroutine. F is given (U 1 = g u 1 , U 2 = g u 2 ), an instance of the CDH problem. F randomly selects two parties and uses U 1 and U 2 as their public keys. F simulates the random oracle H, and tries to find g u 1 u 2 from the hash queries made by A. A complete description of F follows:
1. F is given U 1 , U 2 ∈ G. It begins by selecting random i * and j * from {1, . . . , N }, and letting U 1 and U 2 be the public keys for P i * and P j * , respectively. Assume i * < j * . Public keys of other players are chosen in the specified way.
F then runs A (giving it the vector of public keys for all N parties). The oracle queries of A are answered as follows:
• For queries H(i||j||sid||W ) return a random value v ∈ {0, 1} k . If i = i * and j = j * , store W in a list dh-tuples. (We assume A does not make the same query to H twice.)
• For queries of the form Initiate(i, j), first choose a random nonce r i ∈ {0, 1} k . If this nonce has been chosen before by any party, abort. Otherwise, return r i to A.
• After a query of the form Send(i, k, M ), simply set the session key sk k i equal to a random value in {0, 1} k .
• For queries Execute(i, j) choose random r i , r j ∈ {0, 1} k and abort if either of these values has been chosen as a nonce before (by any party). Otherwise, set sk
• Queries of the form Reveal(i, k) and Test(i, k) are answered in the correct way.
3. Once the experiment has concluded (i.e., A is done) choose a random element in dh-tuples and output it.
The probability that F returns the correct answer is at least Pr A [query ∧ col]/N 2 q h , since the simulation is perfect until the point, if any, that query occurs. Furthermore, since the running time of F is essentially the same as the running time of A we must have Pr A [query ∧ col] ≤ q h N 2 ǫ. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
We remark that the concrete security reduction in Theorem 1 can be improved using the random self-reducibility of the Diffie-Hellman problem.
Protocol T S2
It is easy to see that T S1 does not provide forward secrecy. Forward secrecy can be achieved by adding an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange to T S1. The resulting protocol, T S2, is described below, again from the point of view of player P i wanting to exchange a key with player P j (and P j acts symmetrically):
Setup: Same as in T S1.
Round 1: P i selects a random number α i ∈ R q and sends g α i to the other party.
Computation of session key: P i forms a session identifier by concatenating the messages according to the ordering of P i , P j ; i.e., it sets sid i = g α i ||g α j . P i computes the session key sk i = H(i||j||sid i ||(g α j ) α i ||y x i j ). An example of an execution of T S2 is shown in Fig. 2 (where we assume P 1 < P 2 ). The following characterizes the security of T S2.
Theorem 2 Assuming G satisfies the CDH assumption, T S2 is an FS-secure key-exchange protocol when H is modeled as a random oracle. Concretely, if G is generated by GG which is (t, ǫ)-secure with respect to the CDH problem, then
where t is the maximum total experiment time including the adversary's execution time, and the adversary makes q re Reveal queries, q co Corrupt queries, and q H hash queries. N is an upper bound of the number of parties, and q s is the upper bound on the number of the sessions in the experiment.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Consider an adversary A attacking T S2 in the sense of forward secrecy. Informally, and again using the fact that we work in the random oracle model, there are only two ways an adversary can get information about a particular session key
either the adversary queries the random oracle on the point i||j||sid k i ||g α i α j ||g x i x j , or the value sid k i has repeated at some point during the experiment (for the same pair of users). The latter case happens with probability upper bounded by q 2 s q (where q is the size of the group G), while the former case allows us to solve the computational Diffie-Hellman problem with probability related to that of the adversary's success probability. We now proceed with a more formal proof.
Let col be the event that a value of sid repeats at some point during the experiment. Let corrupt be the event that the adversary makes its Test to a corrupted instance; i.e., that it asks query Test(i, k) and at some point during the experiment asks either Corrupt(P i ) or Corrupt(P j ) (where P j is the partner of instance Π k i ). Note that, by definition of freshness, it must then be the case that the instance Π k i and its partner instance were initiated by an Execute query. Let query 1 be the event that, for some i, j ∈ [N ], the adversary at some point queries the random oracle at a point i||j||U ||V ||X||W , neither P i nor P j are corrupted in the entire course of the experiment, and W = g x i x j . Let query 2 be the event that, for some i, j ∈ [N ], the adversary at some point queries the random oracle at a point i||j||U ||V ||X||W and, for some k, sid
was initiated via a call Execute(i, j) (and hence sid k ′ j = U ||V for some k ′ as well), and X = g α i α j . Since Pr
we have:
Now, as in the previous theorem, we have Pr A [col] ≤ q 2 s /q. Furthermore, following exactly the same argument as in the previous theorem, we may show that Pr A [query 1 ∧ corrupt] ≤ q h N 2 ǫ. We therefore concentrate on upper-bounding the last term of Eq. (2) .
Consider the following algorithm F which attempts to solve the CDH problem using A as a subroutine. F is given (
, an instance of the CDH problem. F will "embed" this instance into all Execute oracle calls and we will use the random self-reducibility of the CDH problem to argue that in case query occurs then F can solve the given CDH instance with probability at least 1/q h . Details follow.
1. F is given U 1 , U 2 ∈ G. It begins by choosing public keys for all parties normally (i.e., choosing a random x i and letting the public key of P i be g x i ).
2. F runs A, answering its oracle queries as follows:
• For queries H(i||j||U ||V ||X||W ), if this query was asked before then return the answer given previously. Otherwise, return a random value v ∈ {0, 1} k . Furthermore, if there is an instance Π k i with sid k i = U ||V and this instance was initiated via a call Execute(i, j), then store (U, V, X) in a list dh-tuples.
• Initiate, Send, Reveal, Test, and Corrupt queries are answered honestly (in particular, when a session key must be computed the appropriate random oracle query is answered as discussed above).
• For queries Execute(i, j) proceed as follows: choose random a, b ∈ q and return the transcript (U 1 g a ||U 2 g b ). The session keys sk
are set equal to a random value in {0, 1} k .
3. Once the experiment has concluded (i.e., A is done), F chooses a random tuple (U, V, X) from its list dh-tuples. It finds a, b such that U = U 1 g a and V = U 2 g b and outputs X/U a 2 U b 1 g ab .
Note that the simulation is perfect until the point, if any, that query 2 occurs. Furthermore, in case query 2 occurs then with probability 1/q h it is the case that F selects a tuple (U, V, X) for which X = g α 1 α 2 , where α 1 def = log g U and α 2 def = log g V (i.e., this tuple is a Diffie-Hellman tuple). Assuming this is the case, we may write X = g u 1 u 2 g ab U b
1 U a 2 where u 1 def = log g U 1 and u 2 def = log g U 2 ; therefore, F indeed outputs a correct solution to its CDH instance. Thus, we see that Pr A [query 2 ] ≤ q H ǫ. Plugging this into Eq. (2) gives the result of the theorem.
Protocol T S3
The security of T S2 (and T S1, for that matter) is proven in the random oracle model. Next, we present protocol T S3 which is proven secure in the standard model (but using the stronger DDH assumption):
j which it will use as a key for a message authentication code (of course, k i,j may need to be hashed before being used; we ignore this technicality here). Next, P i chooses a random number α i ∈ R q , computes τ i ← Mac k i,j (i||j||g α i ), and sends g α i ||τ i to the other party.
Computation of session key: P i verifies the tag of the received message using k i,j . If verification fails, no session key is computed. Otherwise, P i computes a session key sk i = (g α j ) α i . The session identifier is sid i = g α i ||τ i ||g α j ||τ j . An example of an execution of T S3 is shown in Fig. 3 . In the example we assume that P 1 < P 2 . The following characterizes the security of T S3.
Theorem 3 Assuming the MAC used above is SUF-secure and G satisfies the DDH assumption, T S3 is an FS-secure key-exchange protocol. Concretely, if the MAC is (t, q s , ǫ)-SUF-secure and G is generated by GG which is (t, ǫ ′ )-secure with respect to the DDH problem, then
where t is the maximum total experiment time including an adversary's execution time, and an adversary makes q re Reveal queries and q co Corrupt queries. N is an upper bound on the number of parties, and q s is an upper bound of the number of the sessions an adversary initiates.
Proof of Theorem 3.
The intuition is as follows: under the DDH assumption, the adversary cannot have non-negligible advantage unless it can choose a value g x for which it knows x, send this to an instance, and have that instance compute a session key using this value (i.e., if the instance sends Y = g α then the adversary knows the computed session key Y x ). However, this cannot happen with more than negligible probability by the security of the MAC. Details follow.
Consider an adversary A attacking T S3 in the sense of forward secrecy. Let col be the event that a value g α i is used twice (possibly by different parties), and let Ex be the event that the adversary makes its Test query to an instance that was initiated via an Execute query. Let Forge be the event that, for some instance Π k i with partner P j , the adversary queries Send(i, k, M ) and (1) neither P i nor P j were ever corrupted; (2) M was never sent by P j (formally, was never output in response to a query Initiate(j, i) and never appeared in a transcript output by a query Execute(i, j)); and (3) Π k i computes a valid session key. As usual, we may write:
As in the previous proofs, we have Pr
On the other hand, if the input tuple is a random tuple then the adversary A has no information about the bit b used by the Test oracle and so the probability that F outputs 1 in this case is exactly 1/2. Since the difference between these probabilities can be at most ǫ ′ , the claim follows.
Completing the proof, we claim that Pr
To see this, consider the following adversary F:
1. F receives a tuple (g, X, Y, Z) which is either a Diffie-Hellman tuple or a random tuple. F chooses random t 1 , t 2 ∈ [q s ] with t 1 < t 2 (recall, q s is a bound on the number of sessions initiated by A). F chooses public keys for all parties normally.
• Initiate queries are answered normally except for the t th 1 and t th 2 such queries, which are answered as follows: The t th 1 query Initiate(i * , j * ) is answered with X|τ and assume that the instance of i * that is activated is Π k i * . Let the t th 2 query be Initiate(j ′ , i ′ ). If i ′ = i * or j ′ = j * then F aborts (and outputs a random bit). Otherwise, the query is answered with Y |τ ′ . Let the instance of j ′ = j * that is activated by this query be Π k ′ j * . (In both cases, the tags are computed normally, using the appropriate key.)
• Send queries are answered normally, except for queries of the form Send(i * , k,Ỹ ||τ ) and Send(j * , k ′ , M ′ ) (if these queries are ever made). We focus on how the former query is answered, as the latter query is answered analogously. IfỸ ||τ = Y |τ ′ then F sets the session key of instance Π k i * to be Z and we call instance Π k i * good. Ifτ is not a valid tag forỸ , then the instance terminates without a valid session key. If the tag is valid butỸ ||τ does not correspond to a message that was previously output by party j * , then event Forge has occurred and F aborts (and outputs a random bit). Finally, if the tag is valid andỸ ||τ corresponds to a message previously output by j * then F knows log gỸ and can compute a valid session key for instance Π k i * .
• Execute queries are answered normally.
• Reveal and Test are answered normally except in the following cases: if a Reveal query is made to a good instance, then F aborts. If a Test query is not made to a good instance, then F aborts. If F aborts, it outputs a random bit. (In either eventuality, F's guess of t 1 , t 2 was incorrect.)
• Corrupt queries are answered normally except that if A ever queries Corrupt(P i * ) or Corrupt(P j * ) then F aborts and outputs a random bit (as its guess for t 1 , t 2 was incorrect).
3. At the conclusion of the experiment, if neither col nor Ex have occurred and the adversary correctly guesses the value of the bit b used by the Test oracle, then output 1 and say that event Good occurs. In any other case, output a random bit.
The probability that F outputs 1 is Pr[Good] + A variant. In the above description of T S3, each party computes a key k i,j which it then uses to authenticate its message using a message authentication code. It is also possible to have each party P i sign its messages using, for example, its public key y i as a public key for, e.g., the Schnorr signature scheme (in fact, any signature scheme could be used assuming the parties have established the appropriate public keys). In this case, the party must sign (P i , P j , g α i ) (in particular, it should sign the recipient's identity as well) to ensure that the signed message will be accepted only by the intended partner. The proof of security for this modified version is completely analogous to (and, in fact, slightly easier than) the proof of T S3.
